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ABSTRACT 
We measure the impact of municipal policies requiring governments to construct 
green buildings on private-sector adoption of the U.S. Green Building Council's 
Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) standard. Using 
matching methods, panel data, and instrumental variables, we find that 
government procurement rules produce spillover effects that stimulate both 
private-sector adoption of the LEED standard and supplier investments in green 
building expertise. Our findings suggest that government procurement policies 
can accelerate the diffusion of new environmental standards that require 
coordinated complementary investments by various types of private adopter. 
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Governments often use their formidable purchasing power to promote environmental policy 
objectives. In the U.S., federal and many state agencies have incorporated environmental 
attributes in their procurement policies for decades, and government green procurement policies 
are especially prevalent in Europe where they are promoted by the European Commission.
1 The 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the European Union, for example, have 
developed environmentally preferable purchasing guidelines for goods ranging from paint, paper, 
and cleaning supplies to lumber and electricity; many state and local governments have taken 
similar steps (e.g., Clinton 1998; National Association of State Procurement Officials 2010; 
Commission of the European Communities 2008). Some government green procurement policies 
have focused on government buildings, spurred in part by their substantial aggregate energy 
consumption (Coggburn and Rahm 2005, Commission of the European Communities 2008). 
Several U.S. states and a growing number of municipalities have also implemented green 
building procurement policies, most of which refer to the LEED standard (Environmental Law 
Institute 2008; Rainwater 2009). Because government purchases account for 10-15 percent of 
GDP in developed countries, government procurement policies can substantially bolster demand 
for targeted goods and services. 
Beyond directly increasing government-sector demand, some public procurement policies seek 
to spur private demand (Marron 2003) or to spark cost-reducing innovation among suppliers 
(Brander et al. 2003). The European Union, for example, justifies its environmental procurement 
policy not only on the basis of leveraging government demand to “create or enlarge markets for 
environmentally friendly products and services” but also on the basis of stimulating “the use of 
green standards in private procurement” (Commission of the European Communities 2008: 2). 
Similarly, an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) conference on 
greener public purchasing noted that government green procurement policies can not only bring 
about direct environmental benefits through government purchases, but “perhaps more 
significantly” could encourage “the private sector to improve the environmental characteristics 
of their own procurement strategies” and thereby indirectly elicit “the development, 
commercialization and diffusion of less environmentally-damaging products and services.”
2 This 
                                                 
1 For more on government procurement as a policy instrument, see Coggburn and Rahm (2005), Commission of the European 
Communities (2008), McCrudden (2008); Michelsen and de Boer (2009), and National Association of State Procurement 
Officials and Responsible Purchasing Network (2010). 
2 Quoted from a “Summary of Proceedings of Workshop on ‘Budget, Financial & Accounting Issues in Greener Public   2
study is, to our knowledge, the first to investigate whether or not public procurement policies 
actually generate these spillover effects.  
 
We examine whether municipal green building procurement policies that apply only to municipal 
buildings accelerate the use of green building practices by private-sector developers, as 
manifested by more rapid diffusion of the U.S. Green Building Council’s (USGBC) Leadership 
in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) standard for sustainable building practices. We 
find that the LEED standard diffuses nearly twice as quickly among private-sector developers in 
municipalities that adopt government-oriented green building procurement policies, when 
compared to a matched control sample of cities of similar size, demographics, and environmental 
preferences (e.g., citizen support for environmental ballot initiatives, Toyota Prius vehicle 
ownership rates). We also show that the impact of these green building procurement policies 
does not stop at the city line. In particular, we find more LEED adoption among “neighbor 
cities”—those bordering a city that adopted a green building policy—compared to these 
neighboring cities’ own set of matched controls. This neighboring-city effect suggests that our 
estimates capture actual spillovers, rather than unobserved regulatory or political factors that 
might drive both public and private procurement within a city.  
 
To explain the link between public green procurement policies and the diffusion of the LEED 
standard among private developers, we consider three mechanisms that could explain our main 
results. First, government procurement policies might stimulate local private-sector demand for 
green buildings by raising awareness, potentially legitimating a particular standard. Second, 
government procurement might encourage the development of complementary input markets. 
For example, if more architects, contractors, and consultants invest in green building skills and 
credentials, a combination of learning-curve effects and increased competition could drive down 
the cost of developing a LEED-certified building. Thirdly, there might be a coordination failure 
in the market for green buildings, whereby developers are waiting for key suppliers to invest in 
LEED expertise while those same suppliers are waiting for evidence of ample demand from 
developers. In the case of green buildings, municipal government procurement policies might 
                                                                                                                                                             
Purchasing,’” organized by the OECD Environment Directorate and the Austrian Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment 
and Water Management, Vienna, October 29-30, 2001 (Johnstone 2003: 225-235).    3
jump-start the development of specialized input markets by providing a guaranteed demand for 
LEED-accredited professionals and other suppliers, thereby reducing their risk of investing in 
LEED-specific capabilities. 
 
We find no empirical support for the first two mechanisms described above, but do find some 
evidence that supports the third option (i.e., overcoming “excess inertia” in the creation of a 
LEED standard). First, we compare the effects of procurement policies across cities with varying 
taste for green products. We find no evidence that procurement policies had a greater impact in 
greener cities, which suggests that our estimates are not driven by an interaction between general 
awareness of the LEED standard and latent demand for green buildings. Second, we allow the 
effects of green building procurement policies to vary with city size. If procurement policies 
mainly lower the price of private LEED certification by helping local suppliers reach efficient 
scale (and consequently promoting price competition), these policies should have a greater 
impact in small cities where specialized input markets should be less mature. In practice, we find 
stronger policy effects in larger cities, suggesting that procurement policies do more than just 
stimulate entry into the green building labor market. Finally, we use instrumental variables to 
measure the causal impact of LEED Accredited Professionals
3 on private developers’ LEED 
adoption rates and vice versa. There can only be coordination failures in LEED adoption if both 
effects are positive, which we find to be the case.
4   
 
Overall, our findings suggest that government purchasing policies can break deadlocks that 
emerge when coordinated investments are required to adopt a common standard and that this 
stimulates the private-sector market for the goods and services targeted by government green 
procurement policies.  
 
Related literature.—Our study contributes to three broad literature streams. First, we add to a 
nascent literature that characterizes how governments are increasingly incorporating 
                                                 
3 Architects, contractors, consultants, suppliers, and others can learn about LEED and pass a test to earn the title of “LEED 
Accredited Professional.” 
4 To estimate the impact of an increase in LEED Accredited Professionals on private developers’ LEED adoption rates, we use 
green building policy adoption in distant cities as an instrument for LEED Accredited Professionals in nearby cities. To show that 
private developers’ LEED adoption rates cause an increase in the supply of LEED Accredited Professionals, we use new 
construction starts (conditional on city size) to instrument for the level of LEED adoption.   4
environmental criteria into their procurement policies. Much of this work is descriptive. For 
example, Coggburn and Rahm (2005) and May and Koski (2007) describe the emergence of 
green building procurement policies within the U.S. federal and state governments. McCrudden 
(2004) provides an historical context by recounting how governments have used procurement 
policies to promote a host of social objectives. Michelsen and de Boer (2009) and Sourani and 
Sohail (2011) identify barriers to implementing green building procurement policies and 
capabilities that can overcome them. Marron (1997) and Marron (2003) describe the potential 
impacts of government green procurement policies.    
 
We also contribute to a second literature that examines the adoption and impact of green building 
practices. Eichholtz, Kok, and Quigley (2010) provide the first large-scale evidence of private 
benefits from green building, using building-level data to show that green-certified properties 
have higher rents and occupancy rates than comparable properties in the same neighborhood. 
Kok and Jennen (2012) report similar results.  Kahn and Vaughn (2009) show that LEED 
certification and Toyota Prius ownership were highly concentrated in wealthy coastal areas. Kok, 
McGraw, and Quigley (2011) find that the LEED and Energy Star green building certification 
programs have diffused rapidly across U.S. cities; their study revealed a positive association 
between the supply of LEED Accredited Professionals and the growth rate of LEED 
certification.  
 
Unlike prior studies of LEED diffusion, ours focuses on spillovers from public procurement rules 
to private adoption. Choi (2010) finds greater commercial LEED adoption in cities with 
municipal policies that provide formal administrative benefits, such as quicker review cycles for 
green building proposals, or that mandate commercial buildings to incorporate green features. 
We provide evidence of spillover effects on private real estate development even when 
municipal green building procurement policies do not provide explicit rules or incentives to 
encourage private adoption. 
 
Our study also contributes to the broad literature on quality certification. While this literature 
typically emphasizes information problems (see Dranove and Jin (2010) for a review), we focus 
on the role of network effects in the diffusion of a new standard. When the success of a new   5
quality standard depends on many different actors (such as producers, wholesalers, retailers, and 
customers), certification programs will resemble a multi-sided platform, with adoption by one 
group conferring an externality on the others. Farrell and Saloner (1986) model technology 
adoption in the presence of network effects and coin the term “excess inertia” to describe the 
familiar chicken-and-egg coordination problem whereby each side waits for the others to adopt. 
Corts (2010) applies a two-sided platform perspective to study the diffusion of alternative fuels 
and shows that government procurement of “flex fuel” vehicles that run on both gasoline and 
ethanol led to increased supply of ethanol at local filling stations. We follow Corts by measuring 
the impact of government procurement policies on the supply of complements, which in our 
setting is the number of LEED-accredited real estate professionals (e.g., architects and general 
contractors). We extend his analysis by measuring the impact of government procurement 
policies on private adoption of the same goods and services and by evaluating a broader range of 
potential mechanisms. Our results suggest that government procurement rules helped the LEED 
standard overcome excess inertia in local real estate markets. 
 
Finally, by examining the efficacy of government procurement, we contribute to a growing 
literature evaluating alternative regulatory approaches such as voluntary programs and 
agreements (e.g., Delmas and Montes-Sancho 2010; Toffel and Short 2011) and mandatory 
information disclosure programs (e.g., Jin and Leslie 2003; Weil et al. 2006; Bennear and 
Olmstead 2008; Kim and Lyon 2011; Doshi, Dowell, and Toffel 2012). With procurement 
becoming an increasingly popular policy instrument (National Association of State Procurement 
Officials and Responsible Purchasing Network 2010; Commission of the European Communities 
2008), our research confirms the promise of this approach, at least in the context of green 
building. More research is needed to reveal the conditions under which such policies are most 
likely to be effective and to understand potential unintended consequences. 
 
The balance of the paper is organized as follows: Section I outlines a simple framework for 
analyzing the impact of green building procurement policies on the private sector and describes 
the LEED standard. Section II describes our data, measures, and empirical methods. Section III 
describes the empirical results. Section IV offers concluding remarks.   6
I. Public Procurement and Environmental Standards: Theory and Institutions 
A. Procurement Spillovers in Theory 
Government purchasing guidelines often use price preferences or quantity targets (typically 
called set-asides) to reward products that meet environmental criteria such as incorporating 
recycled content, exhibiting pollution levels well below regulatory limits, or exceeding voluntary 
energy efficiency standards. These policies can significantly boost demand for the targeted 
products and services through the government’s own procurement decisions, especially when the 
government is a major customer.  However, the impact of these procurement policies may extend 
beyond this direct effect, depending on how government purchasing interacts with private-sector 
procurement.
5 In practice, governments often try to capitalize on this potential by designing 
policies that they hope will “influence the behavior of other socio-economic actors by setting the 
example, and by sending clear signals to the market-place” (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development 2000: 20).
6 
 
In principle, government procurement policies can influence private-sector purchasing through 
supply channels, demand channels, or both. Moreover, the private-sector response to a 
government green purchasing policy might either reinforce or counteract that policy’s direct 
impacts.
7  
 
Supply Channels.—On the supply side, government green procurement policies can stimulate 
private-sector demand for the targeted products and services when increased government 
purchases reduce suppliers’ average costs, such as when there are significant scale economies or 
learning-curve effects in key input markets.
8 When fixed costs are large relative to the size of the 
                                                 
5 Marron (2003) estimates that government purchases account for less than 20 percent of expenditures in all nondefense product 
categories. 
6 For example, a stated objective of the Massachusetts environmental purchasing policy governing the state’s agencies was to 
“encourage manufacturers and service providers to incorporate environmental and sustainability considerations into their 
products and operations locally, nationally, and even globally” (Patrick 2009). Similarly, one of the priorities of the United 
Kingdom government’s “sustainable procurement” initiative is “stimulating the market to develop more sustainable solutions” 
(United Kingdom Office of Government Commerce 2010).  
7 Donald Marron (2003) provides a general analysis and discussion of green public purchasing. 
8 For instance, many military technologies require substantial up-front R&D expenditures and rely on the scale economies 
produced by military procurement programs to reach cost levels that are suitable for civilian application. This theory is closely 
related to the “induced innovation” hypothesis that procurement preferences lead to increased competition and innovation on the 
targeted product or service attributes. For example, Siemens (2003) suggests that a preference for the Energy Star label in   7
market, government purchases might also spur entry, leading to more competition and lower 
prices (Bresnahan and Reiss 1991).  
 
An alternative theory of positive procurement spillovers is that explicit government preference 
for a particular product or standard will help private market participants overcome excess inertia 
in the adoption process. By stimulating the supply of goods that meet a particular standard, 
government demand can provide a focal point for private demand. This theory assumes that 
private suppliers and customers cannot independently internalize the benefits of a more 
coordinated supply chain, perhaps because of the risk that prior investments in specific standards 
and systems will be stranded or underutilized.
9 For example, the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture’s (USDA) organic certification program was developed partly in response to 
concerns that farmers and consumers were confused by a proliferation of competing private 
organic labels and could not coordinate on a common standard (Fetter and Caswell 2002).  
 
In principle, government procurement policies could also have negative spillovers that stifle 
private consumption. When supply is inelastic, for example, government procurement rules 
might reduce private purchases of the targeted goods through the well-known mechanism of 
“crowding out” (Marron 1997).
10 Alternatively, if procurement rules define a sharp cutoff 
between green and brown products, the private supply of environmental goods might become 
concentrated just above the green-compliance threshold. If some suppliers would have produced 
greener products in the absence of a sharp cutoff, then environmental procurement rules could 
actually reduce the supply of green goods, even as they increase compliance by some firms.
11 
 
Demand Channels.—Government procurement policies might also produce a shift in the private 
demand curve, as opposed to movement along it. For example, procurement policies could 
                                                                                                                                                             
government computer purchasing led to increased innovation in energy-efficient electronics.  
9 Rochet and Tirole (2006) show that a similar coordination failure as the central assumption in the literature on multi-sided 
platforms. 
10 While we could find no clear examples of crowding out in green procurement, there is some evidence that the supply of green 
power is inelastic, so government subsidies for green electricity are primarily spent on marketing and advertising these higher-
priced services to end consumers, as opposed to investing in new generation facilities (Rader 1998). 
11 This seems especially likely when procurement policies are based on voluntary standards developed by firms with strong 
incentives to preempt more stringent regulation (Lyon and Maxwell 1999; King and Lenox 2000; Reid and Toffel 2009). 
Interestingly, this suggests that government purchasing policies should sometimes avoid specifying particular private standards, 
especially when there are questions about the motives of the developers of those standards or about the stringency of the private 
certification.    8
increase the visibility or credibility of a green product (or label) to private consumers, especially 
when consumers are unable to evaluate claimed environmental benefits on their own. Put 
differently, procurement policies might unleash latent demand for green goods simply by raising 
consumer awareness. We expect these information-based demand-side effects to be most salient 
when the green product or label has minimal market share, so awareness is relatively low.  
 
Government procurement rules could also influence private demand by altering the weight that 
consumers attach to specific policy priorities. For instance, a government could exercise moral 
suasion, leading private firms and consumers to follow its purchasing guidelines, if those parties 
are already favorably disposed towards the underlying policy goals. On the other hand, public 
procurement might crowd out private demand if consumers come to perceive that the public 
sector is already “doing enough” to support those same goals.   
 
Government Green Building Procurement Policies.— In practice, the importance of any supply- 
and demand-side channel depends on specific features of that product’s market. There are several 
reasons to expect that, in our analysis, private demand will respond positively to government 
green building procurement policies. First, government is an especially large customer in the real 
estate market. With 26.3 percent of all spending on “maintenance and repair construction” 
coming from federal, state, and local government (Marron 2003), this industry’s share of total 
government purchases is second only to that of munitions. Second, builders can realize direct 
benefits from green investments that produce energy savings or that increase tenants’ willingness 
to pay (Eichholtz, Kok, and Quigley 2010). Third, our analysis covers a period when LEED was 
just emerging as the dominant standard for green building certification (see Figure 1), so 
government procurement policies could plausibly jump-start key input markets if suppliers were 
waiting on private developers to commit to a standard. While each of these factors suggests that 
we should observe a positive correlation between government green building procurement 
policies and private-sector green building certification, they also suggest that we should be 
cautious about extrapolating our findings to settings with mature standards and technologies, few 
direct benefits, or a small share of government purchases.    9
B. LEED Certification and Accreditation 
LEED is a green building certification program developed and administered by the nonprofit 
USGBC. Started in 1998, LEED initially focused on rating the environmental attributes of new 
construction and has since added rating schemes for commercial and retail interior design, 
residences, neighborhoods, and building renovation.  
 
LEED awards points for incorporating specific design elements or meeting environmental 
performance targets in eight categories: location and planning, sustainable sites, water efficiency, 
energy and atmosphere, materials and resources, indoor environmental quality, innovation and 
design, and regional priority. All certified projects must achieve a minimum number of points in 
each category; more total points qualify projects for increasingly prestigious certification levels: 
certified, silver, gold, and platinum. 
 
The LEED certification process begins with the developer registering a project with USGBC, 
which “serves as a declaration of intent to certify” the building, provides the developer access to 
LEED information and tools, and lists the project in the publicly available online LEED project 
database (Green Building Certification Institute 2011). Once the construction or renovations 
have been completed and the certification application is submitted, reviewed, and approved, the 
applicant is sent a plaque (often displayed in the lobby in commercial buildings) and the project 
is included in the online LEED database of certified projects.  
 
The cost of adopting the building practices necessary to obtain LEED certification varies by the 
type and scale of project and by the certification level. Costs accrue by coordinating the required 
design elements and using more expensive materials and technologies. The activities required to 
achieve LEED points range from relatively cheap (such as installing bike racks) to quite 
expensive (remediating a brown-field site). The administrative costs of LEED certification are 
small by comparison, amounting to roughly $450-600 to register a project with USGBC and an 
additional $2,000 certification fee. Some developers hire a consultant to provide guidance on the 
LEED-eligibility of particular design choices and procurement decisions and to prepare the 
LEED application.  
   10
The benefits of LEED can accrue from increased rents and occupancy rates and from reduced 
operating costs. Several studies have found that LEED-certified buildings charge a 3-5 percent 
rent premium and have higher sale prices and occupancy rates (Chegut, Eichholtz, and Kok 
2012; Eichholtz, Kok, and Quigley 2010, forthcoming; Fuerst and McAllister 2011a, 2011b).  
Evidence of reduced operating costs is mixed, in part because LEED certification emphasizes 
design elements rather than energy consumption. Engineering studies suggest that LEED 
certification is correlated with increased energy efficiency (Turner and Frankel 2008; Newsham, 
Mancini, and Birt 2009; Sabapathy et al. 2010). For example, engineering estimates from a study 
of 121 LEED-certified projects that volunteered data on energy use suggest that these buildings 
consume 25-30 percent less energy than the national average for comparable projects (Turner 
and Frankel 2008), though others have raised concerns that some LEED-certified buildings do 
not deliver energy savings (Navarro 2009).  
 
The LEED certification system debuted in 1998 but did not achieve significant scale until the 
second half of the 2000s. Figure 1 shows the number of new LEED registrations per year from 
2000 to 2007. This figure reached 1,000 in 2005 and jumped to 4,000 in 2007 (the peak of the 
real estate cycle).
12 LEED’s growth reflects several factors, including increased awareness of the 
program, a growing installed base of LEED Accredited Professionals, and the creation of new 
LEED certification programs for building categories such as homes and renovations. Figure 1 
also shows that federal, state, and local governments have been significant LEED adopters since 
the program began.  
 
C. Empirical Roadmap 
 
Our analysis of LEED diffusion builds on the idea that the standard resembles a multi-sided 
platform that facilitates interactions among real-estate developers and suppliers of green-building 
inputs (e.g., professional services or building materials). Thus, our first set of empirical results 
measures the strength of “same side” spillovers in LEED adoption between government and 
private developers.
13 Specifically, we find a positive relationship between the adoption of 
                                                 
12 The LEED-registered project directory (www.usgbc.org/LEED/Project/RegisteredProjectList.aspx) shows that registrations 
continued to accelerate in 2008 and 2009 even as the overall market for commercial real estate markets cooled off. 
13 We borrow the “same side” terminology from the literature on multi-sided platforms to denote an externality between two   11
government green building procurement policies and the number of LEED-registered private-
sector buildings. This relationship could exist for a variety of reasons, including demonstration 
effects, moral suasion, scale economies, learning effects, anticipated regulatory changes, and a 
correlation between municipal green building policies and preferential treatment in the municipal 
permitting process for developers offering green buildings. We attempt to rule out several of 
these explanations by examining whether or not green building procurement policies have a 
greater impact in larger or greener cities and by measuring the policies’ impact on private 
developers in neighboring cities, who would benefit from spillovers produced by a focal city’s 
green building policy but would not, for example, receive preferential treatment in its permitting 
process.  
 
Our second set of empirical results measures the strength of “cross-side” spillovers in LEED 
adoption between developers and building-industry professionals.
14 As with any platform, a 
larger installed base on one side should generate an increased supply of complements on the 
other. We show that government green building procurement policies stimulate investment in 
green building expertise among local real estate professionals (measured as the number of LEED 
Accredited Professionals). In principle, real estate professionals might invest in this green 
building know-how without any government encouragement or formal certification program if 
they expected this human capital to be rewarded in the marketplace. However, uncertainty about 
whether and how the market will observe, measure, and reward green building creates a 
possibility of stranded investment and thus an opportunity for government procurement 
spillovers.  
 
While our analysis of “cross-side” spillovers examines the impact on LEED-accredited real 
estate professionals, we expect government green building procurement policies to jump-start a 
host of complementary input markets. For instance, producers and local distributors of building 
materials might be more likely to carry products that meet LEED criteria after a green building 
procurement policy is adopted. Viewing the number of LEED Accredited Professionals as a 
proxy for a host of specialized green inputs helps clarify why developers might be slow to adopt 
                                                                                                                                                             
groups of users that do not transact with one another but typically use a standard or platform in a similar way. 
14 In the literature on multi-sided platforms, a “cross-side effect” is a positive externality between two groups that use a platform 
to interact with one another, such as video game players and video game developers.    12
LEED even if they believed there is latent demand for green buildings: the cumulative expense 
of being a green first-mover could be large, even if contractors and architects constitute a small 
share of total construction costs.  
 
In our final set of analyses, we switch from measuring the reduced form impacts of government 
green procurement policies to measuring the structural links between each side of the LEED 
platform. In particular, we estimate the causal impact of LEED Accredited Professionals on 
private-sector LEED registrations by using “distant” green procurement policies as an 
instrumental variable. The key maintained assumption in this analysis is that municipal green 
procurement policies in far-away cities increase the supply of LEED Accredited Professionals in 
nearby markets, but are otherwise excluded from the LEED adoption decisions of private 
developers in a focal market. To estimate the causal impact of LEED Registrations on LEED 
Accredited Professionals, we use the number of new buildings constructed between 2003 and 
2007 (conditional on city size) as an instrument for Registrations. We find that both of these 
structural relationships are positive, which supports the theory that government procurement 
policies may promote LEED diffusion by helping real-estate developers and building-industry 
professionals overcome “excess inertia” in the early stages of the adoption process.   
II. Data and Measures 
To assess the impact of municipal green building procurement policies on private-sector 
adoption of LEED-certified green building practices, we collected data on 735 California cities 
from 2001 to 2008. We selected California primarily because it is the state with the largest 
number of municipal green building policies. Our dataset combines information from a variety of 
sources. We obtained LEED diffusion data from the USGBC, nonresidential construction starts 
data from McGraw Hill, and city-level demographic data from the U.S. Census; we hand-
collected data on the municipal adoption of green building policies. Summary statistics are 
presented in Table 1. 
 
We use two main outcome variables to measure the diffusion of LEED within the private sector 
and one variable to measure government LEED adoption. All of our outcomes are based on data 
obtained from the USGBC. Our unit of analysis is the city (or city-year), where we define cities   13
in terms of a Census Place, the geographical unit with available Census demographics and voting 
records data that most closely resembles the political unit of a municipality. 
 
LEED Registrations—Annual Private LEED Registrations is an annual count of new privately 
owned nonresidential or multi-unit residential buildings that registered for LEED certification. 
This number reflects private-sector developers’ intention to use green building practices.
15 Total 
Private LEED Registrations is the total (cumulative) number of Annual  Private LEED 
Registrations for each city during our sample period of 2001 to 2008. This total ranged from 0 to 
99 across all the cities in our estimation sample (which excludes Los Angeles, San Francisco, 
San Diego, and San Jose).
16 On average, there were two new LEED-registered buildings in a city 
in our sample over this time period.  
 
We also created a count of Annual Government LEED Registrations to verify that municipal 
government green procurement policies actually lead to an increase in government LEED 
procurement. This variable is a count of new nonresidential structures that are owned by a local 
government and that were registered for LEED certification. Total  Government LEED 
Registrations is each city’s total number of Annual Government LEED Registrations from 2001 
to 2008. The cities in our sample registered a total of 0 and 12 new government buildings, with 
an average of 0.3 LEED-registered buildings per city between 2001 and 2008. 
 
LEED Accredited Professionals—Our second outcome measure captures LEED-specific human 
capital investments by local real estate professionals. Annual LEED Accredited Professionals is 
the annual number of building industry professionals (such as architects, contractors, and 
consultants) who passed the USGBC’s LEED accreditation exam between 2001 and 2008. This 
exam certifies that such professionals have knowledge of green building practices in general and 
                                                 
15 LEED registration is only the first step towards certification. The USGBC encourages projects to register early, since many 
decisions that will influence certification levels must be taken at early stages of the development process. Because the lag from 
registration to certification can be several years and the LEED standard was diffusing rapidly toward the end of our sample 
period, a count of certified buildings would have excluded a large number of projects in our data set. For the buildings for which 
we have certification data, the average lag between registration and certification is between two and three years. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that few registered buildings fail to certify at some level. A drawback of relying on the number of LEED 
registrations or of LEED certifications is that they do not contain any information on the environmental impact of certification, a 
topic we leave to future research. 
16 We exclude the four largest cities in California when calculating these summary statistics, since they (a) could not be matched 
for the analysis below and (b) tend to distort the sample averages due to their extreme size.    14
the LEED standard in particular. In 2004, it cost roughly $350 to take this test. Total LEED 
Accredited Professionals is the total number of Annual LEED Accredited Professionals from 
2001 to 2008. We obtained the city locations of LEED Accredited Professionals from their 
business addresses maintained in the USGBC directory of LEED Accredited Professionals. By 
2008, there were between 0 and 416 such professionals in each city in our estimation sample, 
with an average of 7.5 per city. 
 
Government Procurement Policies—Our main explanatory variables indicate whether or not a 
focal city (or a city that borders a focal city) had adopted a municipal green building policy 
targeting only government buildings by the current calendar year. We gathered this policy 
information by hand, starting from lists compiled by the USGBC and the U.S. Department of 
Energy-funded Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE).
17 We 
identified 155 U.S. cities that had adopted some type of green building ordinance by 2008. Forty 
were in California, though we exclude from our analysis seven cities whose regulations impose 
green building mandates on private-sector development. (The municipal green building 
procurement policy adopter cities in California are listed in the Appendix.)  
 
Municipal green building policies vary along several dimensions, including the types of structure 
affected (by size, owner, and use); whether they cover only new buildings or also renovations; 
and how they measure environmental performance. We gathered details on each policy from city 
websites and the online library of municipal codes.
18 Our research indicates that 87 percent of all 
green building polices contained a purchasing rule—that is, a requirement that new public 
projects adhere to some type of environmental standard—and that 90 percent of these rules 
specified the LEED standard.  
 
For cross-sectional models, we create a time-invariant indicator variable, Green Policy Adopter, 
that equals 1 if a city had adopted a green procurement policy by 2008 and equals 0 otherwise. 
For panel data models, we create a time-varying indicator variable, Green Policy Adopted, coded 
                                                 
17 We acknowledge the excellent research assistance provided by Mark Stout. The DSIRE list of state and local incentives is 
available at http://www.dsireusa.org/ and the USGBC list can be found at 
http://www.usgbc.org/PublicPolicy/SearchPublicPolicies.aspx?PageID=1776 . 
18 Available at www.municode.com.   15
1 starting the year a city adopted a green procurement policy and 0 before that. Similarly, for the 
neighboring city analysis, we create (a) a time-invariant indicator, Green Policy Adopter 
Neighbor, that equals 1 for cities that had not adopted a green procurement policy but bordered a 
city that had done so by 2008, and equals 0 otherwise, and (b) a time-varying indictor variable, 
Green Policy Adopted Neighbor, coded 1 for cities that had not adopted a green procurement 
policy but bordered a city that had done so by the focal year, and coded 0 otherwise. Four 
percent of the cities in our estimation sample had adopted a municipal green building policy by 
2008 and 15 percent of the cities in our sample are green policy adopter neighbors. While our 
matching procedure (described below) excludes Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Diego, and San 
Jose from the analysis of procurement policy adopters, each of these cities does in fact adopt a 
green building procurement policy, and therefore provides variation in the treatment condition 
used in the neighbor city analysis.  
 
Construction Activity—To control for variation in the underlying rate of new building activity, 
we purchased data on new building starts from McGraw Hill’s Dodge Construction Reports. The 
control variable Total New Buildings is a cumulative count of nonresidential construction starts 
between 2003 and 2007 (the years we could afford to purchase). The mean number of new 
nonresidential construction starts for a city in our estimation sample from 2003 to 2007 was 
26.21. Since this variable is highly skewed and strongly correlated with city population (ρ = 
0.88), we also calculated the number of new Buildings per Capita.  
 
Demographics—For each city in the analysis, we obtained Population (measured in units of 
10,000), Income (median household income in $10,000s), and College (the share of adults with 
some college education) at the Census-Place level from the 2000 U.S. Census.  
 
Environmental Preferences—We collected several measures of a city’s prevailing preference for 
environmental sustainability. First, we gathered data on citizens’ political preferences by 
calculating Green Ballot Share as the proportion of citizens’ votes in favor of statewide ballot 
initiatives addressing environmental quality (Kahn 2002; Wu and Cutter 2011). Using data from 
University of California’s Statewide Database (http://swdb.berkeley.edu/), we calculated the 
proportion of votes in favor of various environmental ballot initiatives during 1996-2000 within   16
the Census Place that best corresponded to each city. These ballot initiatives received support 
from an average of 61 percent of each city’s citizenry.  
 
Second, we obtained data on green purchasing behaviors by calculating the proportion of 
vehicles registered in 2008 that were Toyota Priuses, based on ZIP-code-level vehicle 
registration data from RL Polk (Kahn and Vaughn 2009; Kahn 2011). We aggregate these 
registration data to the city level to reflect the Prius market share in each city, creating the 
variable Prius Share, which has a mean of 0.54 percent.
19  
 
Finally, using data from the League of Conservation Voters (LCV), we calculated the proportion 
of pro-environment votes on environment-related bills cast by each city’s delegates to the 
California State Senate and House of Representatives. These variables, LCV Senate Score and 
LCV House Score, range from 0 (for cities whose delegates voted against all environmental-
related bills) to 100 (for cities whose delegates voted in favor of all such bills), with an average 
near 50 for both the House and Senate across all cities in our estimation sample. 
 
III. Analysis and Results  
A. Matching and Balance 
To generate unbiased estimates of the causal impact of government green building procurement 
policies on private-sector LEED registrations and LEED-accredited professionals, we construct a 
matched sample using the Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) procedure developed by Iacus, 
King, and Porro (2012). This approach assumes that, after stratifying and reweighting the data to 
account for the distribution of observed exogenous variables, the endogenous treatment variables 
(Green Policy Adopter and Green Policy Adopter Neighbor) are as good as randomly assigned. 
Intuitively, CEM is just a method of preprocessing a dataset before running a weighted least-
squares regression. One begins by “coarsening” (discretizing) the variables in order to construct 
a multi-dimensional histogram. The next step is to discard observations from any cell that does 
not contain both treated and control observations. Finally, the units are weighted such that a 
                                                 
19 The highest Prius registration rate is 3.74 percent in Portola Valley (just west of Palo Alto).   17
weight of 1 is assigned to each treated unit, and a weight of Ti/Ci is assigned to each control 
observation in cell i (where Ti and Ci are the number of treatment and control observations, 
respectively, in the i-th stratum of the multi-dimensional histogram). Weighted least-squares 
estimation then yields an estimate of the treatment effect for treated cities. 
 
Iacus, King, and Porro (2012) describe several advantages of CEM over the propensity score and 
other matching techniques. Unlike conventional regression control methods, CEM does not 
extrapolate counterfactual outcomes to regions of the parameter space where there are no data on 
controls. Because CEM is non-parametric, there is no possibility that a mis-specified model of 
selection will produce greater imbalance in variables that are omitted from the matching 
procedure, which can happen with the propensity score. Moreover, CEM ensures that the 
reweighted control sample matches all of the sample moments of the treated sample, not just the 
means.
20 Finally, Monte Carlo tests and comparisons to experimental data suggest that CEM 
outperforms alternative matching estimators that rely on the same fundamental assumption of 
exogenous treatment conditional on observables. 
 
We use CEM to construct two matched samples: one consisting of green policy adopters and 
their quasi-control group and another consisting of green policy adopter neighbors and their 
quasi-control group. In both cases, our goal is to achieve balance—statistically indistinguishable 
distributions between the treatments and controls—across a set of exogenous covariates that 
might lead to policy adoption, including environmental preferences (measured with Prius Share, 
Green Ballot Share,  LCV Senate Score, and LCV House Score), market size and growth 
(Population, Total New Buildings, and Buildings per Capita), and income and education (Income 
and College).  
 
For the green policy adopters, we match on Population and Prius Share, which yields a matched 
sample consisting of 26 adopters and 180 controls. When coarsening Population, we create 10 
strata.
21 This results in a very close match on the size distribution, but leads to a curse of 
dimensionality (that is, very small samples) if we include many additional variables in the match. 
                                                 
20 This property of CEM proved important in our application, where the city-size distribution is highly skewed 
21 We set cut points at 10, 50, 70, 100, 120, 150, 250, 300, 350, and 470 thousand inhabitants, and omit cities above the top 
threshold because there are no suitable controls.    18
So, for the policy adopter cities, we add only Prius Share, with cut points at the 25th, 50th, 75th, 
90th, and 95th percentiles.
22 Because the green policy neighbors sample is somewhat larger, we 
also match on Income,  Green Ballot Share, and LCV Senate Score. However, to prevent a 
substantial drop in sample size, we use a very coarse match for these additional variables.
23 Our 
final estimation sample for the neighbor city contains 80 green policy neighbors and 291 
matched control cities. Green Policy Adopter cities are not used as potential controls for the 
sample of Green Policy Adopter Neighbors. 
 
Table 2 illustrates how CEM dramatically improves the balance in the means of exogenous 
covariates across the treatment and control samples. Each row in the table reports means for the 
treatment and control cities in a particular sample and a t-statistic from regressing each covariate 
on the treatment dummy (Green Policy Adopter or Green Policy Adopter Neighbor). Panel A of 
Table 2 compares all cities that adopt a green building policy, excluding the four largest, to the 
full set of potential controls (that is, to all other cities in California) using unweighted OLS 
regressions.
24 Not surprisingly, we find that cities adopting a green building policy are larger, 
greener, wealthier, and better educated than the potential controls. There is a statistically 
significant difference in the means of each variable except for the per-capita measure of new 
construction activity. 
 
Panel B of Table 2 compares CEM-weighted means for the matched sample of green policy 
adopters and their controls. Note that matching on Population and Prius Share excludes three 
cities (Oakland, Berkeley, and Ventura) from the treatment group, reducing it to just 25 green 
building procurement policy adopters. Since we used the distributions of Population and Prius 
Share to construct the match, by construction we should observe no difference in the means of 
these variables across treatment and control cities. In fact, Panel B of Table 2 shows that 
matching on just these two dimensions eliminates the statistical significance of differences in the 
                                                 
22 In terms of actual registration rates, the corresponding values are 0.5, 0.8, 1.0, 1.5, and 2.7 percent of all registered vehicles. 
23 For the neighbor-city matching, we leave the Population cut points unchanged. We continue to use the 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th, 
and 95th percentiles of Prius Share, which correspond to registration rates of 0.26, 0.56, 1.21, 1.78, and 2.36 percent of all 
vehicles. Finally, we set cut points at the 25th and 75th percentiles of Income ($44 and $70 thousand) and at the medians of 
Green Ballot Share (67 percent approval) and LCV Senate Score (44 points). 
24 Each of the four largest cities in California (Los Angeles, San Diego, San Jose, and San Francisco) has adopted a green 
building procurement policy. Including these cities in the analysis leads to a dramatic increase in imbalance and a similarly large 
increase in the results presented below.   19
means of all observables across the matched adopters and non-adopters.  
 
Panel C of Table 2 compares means for green policy neighboring cities and their matched 
controls. Once again, CEM matching and reweighting removes differences in the means of the 
exogenous covariates. Though we do not show raw comparisons for green policy neighbor cities, 
they are also larger, greener, wealthier, and better educated than the potential controls. As in 
Panel A, the raw means of all variables are statistically significantly different across green policy 
neighbor cities and the potential controls. For this sample, matching removes 31 green policy 
neighbor cities and 324 potential controls. 
B. Preliminary Graphical Analysis 
Figure 2 illustrates how the CEM-weighted means of our two main outcome variables (Private 
LEED Registrations and LEED Accredited Professionals) evolved in green policy adopters and 
their neighboring cities relative to their matched controls from 2002 to 2008. All four bar graphs 
in Figure 2 illustrate the same rapid acceleration in LEED diffusion that we observed in Figure 1. 
And in all four cases, the effect is more pronounced for green policy adopters (or their 
neighbors) than for the relevant matched and weighted control samples.
25 We also observe a 
small “bump” in LEED Accredited Professionals for both treated and control cities in 2004, 
which was likely driven by anticipated changes in the USGBC exam that increased the costs of 
becoming a LEED Accredited Professional.  
 
The following sections use cross-sectional and panel regression to explore whether the 
differences in the patterns observed for treatment and control cities in Figure 2 are statistically 
significant. After finding that they do differ significantly, we use instrumental variables to 
estimate the causal relationships between Total Private LEED Registrations and Total LEED 
Accredited Professionals and we use interaction effects to investigate particular mechanisms that 
might drive the procurement policy effects.  
                                                 
25 These patterns are even more striking if we do not use the CEM weights, since there are relatively more small cities in the 
matched control samples and the weighting procedure makes these small markets less important.   20
C. Cross-sectional Analysis 
Cross-sectional Model—We begin our empirical analysis with a cross-sectional comparison of 
cumulative LEED adoption in the matched green policy adopters and control cities.
26 The 
Coarsened Exact Matching procedure described above creates a matched group of treatment and 
control cities that are balanced with respect to all of the observable covariates we associate with 
policy adoption. Under the assumption that assignment to the treatment group is independent of 
potential outcomes conditional on observables, a simple t-test is sufficient to estimate the causal 
impact of the green building procurement policy. Since adding controls might lead to increased 
precision, we use OLS regression instead of a t-test.
27 Specifically, we estimate the following 
linear regression: 
(1)   Yi = αi + β · GreenPolicyi + γ · Xi + εi , 
where Yi is either Total Government LEED Registrations, Total Private LEED Registrations, or 
Total LEED Accredited Professionals in city i as of 2008. Xi represents a set of controls for 
factors potentially associated with LEED adoption: environmental preferences (Prius Share, 
Green Ballot Share,  LCV Senate Score, and LCV House Score), market size and economic 
growth (Population, New Buildings, and Buildings per Capita), educational attainment (College), 
and wealth (Income). 
 
As described above, the city-size and demographic variables were obtained from the 2000 
Census, Prius registration data are from 2008, and the green ballot share is averaged over 1996-
2000. We are interested in the coefficient β, which measures the difference in LEED adoption  
between Green Policy Adopter cities and their matched controls (or alternatively, between Green 
Policy Adopter Neighbors and their matched control cities).  
 
Cross-sectional Results—We estimate this cross-sectional model using CEM-weighted OLS 
regressions.
28 The results are presented in the Panel A of Table 3. Columns 1-3 report estimates 
from weighted OLS regressions that compare CEM-matched green policy adopters to their 
                                                 
26 The cross section is based on data through 2008. 
27 It should be emphasized, however, that we do not use the control variables to extrapolate potential outcomes to regions of the 
parameter space where there are very few treated or untreated units. 
28 As stressed in Angrist and Pischke (2009), OLS provides the best linear approximation to the conditional expectation function, 
even though Yi is a count variable. Estimating a model with an exponential conditional expectation function (i.e., Poisson with a 
robust covariance matrix) produces similar results.   21
control cities.  
 
Our estimates of the spillover effects of government procurement on private-sector demand are 
found in Column 1. We find a statistically significant increase of 7.5 private LEED registrations 
in cities with a green building policy. Since the weighted mean of private LEED registrations is 
8.3, this estimate is a 90-percent increase in LEED adoption. The results in Column 2 show that 
government green procurement policies—as intended—spur greater municipal green building. 
We find an average of 1.6 more government LEED registrations in cities adopting a green 
building procurement policy. While this is not surprising given that 90 percent of these policies 
use LEED as the relevant yardstick, it is nevertheless reassuring to see a large and statistically 
significant direct impact. Column 3 shows an increase of 15.7 LEED Accredited Professionals in 
green policy adopting cities relative to their matched controls. This is an increase of roughly 38 
percent beyond the weighted mean of 40.8, but is not statistically significant. This result is 
statistically weaker than the private LEED registration result (Column 1) partly because real 
estate professionals are often based in surrounding communities, an issue we discuss in detail 
below. 
 
Panel B in Table 3 shows that our estimates change very little if the CEM weights are dropped 
from the OLS regression. We also found that the CEM-weighted results are robust to dropping 
various groups of control variables and that the estimated treatment effect increases significantly 
if we drop both the CEM weights and the regression controls or if we ignore the matching 
procedure (results not reported). 
 
Columns 4-6 in Table 3 focus on cities that border a green policy adopter. These models estimate 
the effect of a green building policy on green policy neighbors compared to the effect on their 
matched controls. We examine the policy impact on neighboring cities for three reasons. First, 
the neighboring city sample might address lingering concerns about omitted variables (for 
example, tastes for green-ness) that could influence both policy adoption and private-sector 
LEED building rates. Second, the neighbors provide a larger and more representative sample of 
“treated” cities. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the presence or absence of neighboring-
city effects tells us something about the underlying mechanism that links government green   22
procurement policies to private-sector adoption of LEED. In particular, if the effect of green 
policies within adopting cities is mainly driven by unobserved (to the analyst) regulatory or 
zoning preferences for LEED projects, we would expect much smaller effects in neighboring 
non-adopting cities that presumably do not offer such preferences. Put differently, we are 
looking for evidence of spillovers, which should not stop at the city line. 
 
We find a statistically significant increase of 0.9 private LEED registrations among neighbors 
relative to their matched controls (Column 4). When normalized by the baseline registration rate 
of 1.5 buildings per year, this translates to a marginal effect of 61 percent, which is somewhat 
smaller than the 90-percent marginal effect for green policy adopters (Column 1). Again, these 
results are robust to the omission of CEM weights and controls, as illustrated in Panel B. From 
these findings, we conclude that the link between government green building procurement 
policies and the private-sector adoption of green building practices is not solely due to 
preferential treatment of green buildings by city-level zoning or permitting officials. Instead, our 
results imply that these procurement policy effects reflect a spillover from green policy adopter 
cities to private developers in neighboring cities. This interpretation of the neighbor-city effects 
is also consistent with our finding (Column 5) that the number of government LEED 
registrations is significantly higher in neighboring cities that do not themselves adopt a green 
building procurement policy—but that might respond to the emergence of a LEED-based green 
building infrastructure—than in these neighboring cities’ matched controls. 
 
Finally, Column 6 in Table 3 presents weighted OLS estimates of the impact of being a green 
policy neighbor on the number of LEED Accredited Professionals. We find a statistically 
significant increase of 4.1 LEED Accredited Professionals, or roughly 56 percent of the weighted 
mean for controls. This suggests that the market for architects, contractors, consultants, and 
others with green building capabilities is regional, with spillover from policy adopters to 
neighboring cities helping to explain the statistically weaker impact of policy adoption on LEED 
Accredited Professionals in the policy-adopting cities themselves (Column 3). Put another way, 
the expected effect was there, but we had to look further afield to see it.   23
D. Difference-in-Differences  
We now exploit the panel nature of our policy-adoption and outcome measures to estimate 
models that compare LEED diffusion in treatment and control cities before and after the adoption 
of a green procurement policy. Specifically, we estimate the following two-way fixed-effects 
model:  
(2)  Yit = αi + λt + β GreenPolicyAdoptedit + γ · Xit + εit, 
where αi is a set of city fixed effects that absorb all other time-invariant city-level covariates, λt is 
a set of year dummies, and Xit measures annual nonresidential construction starts in city i in year 
t. The coefficient β measures the impact of adopting a green building procurement policy on 
treated cities. We estimate the model by OLS (without weights), assuming that, within our 
matched sample, policy adoption is as good as randomly assigned after conditioning on city 
fixed effects (Heckman and Hotz 1989). 
 
The results of these difference-in-difference models are reported in Table 4. The large, positive, 
and statistically significant estimates of β indicate a robust treatment effect for our main LEED 
adoption outcomes in both samples. We estimate an increase of 2.3 private LEED registrations 
per year in green policy adopters and 0.15 private LEED registrations per year in green policy 
adopter neighbors. We also find a statistically significantly increase of 11.0 LEED Accredited 
Professionals per year in the adopter cities and 1.2 per year in the neighboring cities. 
 
In the bottom two rows of Table 4, we report F-tests of the null hypothesis that there is no 
difference in the trends of the outcome variable between treatment and control cities prior to the 
adoption of the green building procurement policy. To implement this test, we drop all 
observations where GreenPolicyAdoptedit equals 1 from the estimation sample, add a new set of 
indicator variables that equal 1 t years before a city i adopts a policy (where t equals 1 through 
4), and report an F-test for the joint significance of these pre-policy indicators. We find no 
evidence that private developers in green policy adopters had different LEED registration trends 
than private developers in the control cities. However, there is some evidence that local 
governments tried LEED before adopting the procurement policy and that real estate 
professionals in policy adopter cities were becoming LEED-accredited at a higher rate before the   24
policies went into place.
29 We find no difference in the pre-adoption trends for any outcome in 
the policy adopter neighboring cities.   
 
Since there is typically some public discussion prior to the adoption of a green building 
procurement policy, it is not especially surprising to find real estate professionals moving 
slightly ahead of the policy change. Indeed, our preferred interpretation of the results in Tables 3 
and 4 is that municipal green building policies help solve the coordination problem among 
developers and complementary input suppliers by providing a highly visible source of demand 
for green building inputs. To provide further evidence for this interpretation, we turn to a set of 
analyses showing that the data do not support some of the alternative mechanisms discussed 
above. 
E. Awareness of LEED 
One alternative to our proposed mechanism is that developers, consumers, and input suppliers 
were unaware of LEED certification before their municipal government adopted a green building 
policy. This is a plausible story, particularly given the overall trend in LEED adoption depicted 
in Figure 1, which we take as evidence of increased awareness of the potential rents available to 
green development (Eichholtz, Kok, and Quigley 2012). If a combination of latent demand and 
increased awareness were driving our results, we would expect to see public green procurement 
policy having a larger impact in cities where there is a higher demand for other green amenities, 
since the publicity surrounding the municipal government’s commitment would raise awareness 
of green building practices, which would stimulate private-sector adoption. We explore this idea 
by estimating cross-sectional OLS models that predict Private LEED Registrations based on 
interactions of a city’s average preference for environmental amenities (Prius Share and Green 
Ballot Share) with Green Policy Adopter.
30  
 
The results in Table 5 show that private developers in cities with a greater share of Prius 
registrations or greater support for green ballot initiatives do not exhibit a stronger response to a 
                                                 
29 Using an alternative hazard specification, we find no significant influence of either cumulative LEED registrations or 
cumulative LEED Accredited Professionals on the adoption of a government green building procurement policy (results available 
upon request). 
30 In each regression, we demean the continuous variable in the interaction, so the main effect of policy adoption can be 
interpreted as an average treatment effect on the treated.   25
public green procurement policy. While the Prius Share interactions are imprecise, the 
interactions with Green Ballot Share are essentially zero for the neighbor city sample. LCV 
House Score and LCV Senate Score also yielded precisely estimated zeroes on the interaction 
term (unreported). These results are robust to dropping the CEM weights and varying the set of 
control variables. Overall, the results in Table 5 suggest that the measured green procurement 
policy effects do not stimulate latent demand by making consumers, developers, and suppliers 
more aware of the possibility of LEED certification.  
F. Entry and Scale Economies 
A second alternative to the coordination mechanism that we emphasize is that government 
procurement simply increases demand to the point at which building industry professionals can 
recover the fixed costs of LEED accreditation. In this story, private-sector adoption follows 
because learning and increased competition drive down the price of green inputs closer to 
suppliers’ average cost once a larger number of LEED Accredited Professionals have entered the 
local market.  
 
One testable implication of the scale-and-entry-based explanation of our measured procurement 
policy effects is that the impact of municipal procurement policies should decline with city-size. 
Intuitively, private demand for LEED buildings is more likely to cover a supplier’s entry costs in 
large markets, leading to robust competition among suppliers operating at efficient scale 
(Bresnahan and Reiss 1991). With competitive factor markets, the increased demand from a 
municipal procurement policy will have little or no impact on suppliers’ average costs or the 
prices charged to a green building developer.  
 
We examine the link between city-size and the impact of municipal green procurement policies 
by estimating cross-sectional OLS regression models of the number of LEED Accredited 
Professionals on two measures of market size (Population and Total  New Buildings), each 
interacted with our two treatment dummies (Green Policy Adopter and Green Policy Adopter 
Neighbor). The results of these four models, reported in Columns 1-4 of Table 6, suggest that the 
impact of policy adoption on the number of LEED Accredited Professionals increases with city-
size for policy-adopter cities and has no relationship to city-size among policy adopter   26
neighbors.
31 These results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that government procurement 
policies promote entry in markets where limited private demand had been insufficient to 
convince real estate professionals and other input providers to invest in LEED-specific 
capabilities.  
G. Indirect Network Effects 
The results thus far measure the impact of government green procurement policy adoption on 
private-sector green building activity and on real estate professionals’ investments in human 
capital for green building. Our findings are consistent with the explanation that green building 
procurement policies can break a deadlock among real estate professionals, who are reluctant to 
invest in LEED accreditation without evidence of demand, and building developers, who are 
reluctant to embark on building green until local real estate professionals have invested in 
acquiring expertise. However, we have not yet tried to measure the indirect network effects at the 
heart of this story; that is, the causal impact of LEED Accredited Professionals on LEED 
registrations and vice versa. Our theory that procurement policies help local markets overcome 
“excess inertia” requires both of these structural parameters to be positive.  
 
Instrumental Variable Models—We use instrumental variables to estimate the indirect network 
effects. To identify the impact of the number of LEED-accredited professionals on the number of 
private LEED registrations, we require an instrument that is correlated with the supply of LEED 
Accredited Professionals but uncorrelated with unobserved drivers of private LEED 
registrations. We propose to use government green procurement policy adoption in “distant” 
cities as our instrument. Specifically, we use the log of the number of green policy adopter cities 
between 25 and 50 miles from the center of the focal city to instrument for the number of LEED 
Accredited Professionals in all cities within 25 miles of that focal city. This instrument is 
motivated by the assumption that markets served by building industry professionals are more 
dispersed than both the drivers of municipal procurement policy and the direct impact of green 
building procurement policies. Put differently, we assume that green building procurement 
policies in cities that are 25 to 50 miles away have no impact on developers of private buildings 
other than through the supply of LEED Accredited Professionals, which we view as a proxy for a 
                                                 
31 Once again, the results are robust to dropping the CEM weights and varying the set of regression controls.   27
host of local green inputs.  
 
Figure 3 provides some evidence that building industry professionals might transmit the impact 
of green building procurement policies over distances of 25 to 50 miles. It shows a histogram of 
the distance between architects’ and general contractors’ business locations and the project sites 
they work on, based on our McGraw Hill project-level construction starts data. The median 
distance between a project and a professional’s office address is 28 miles; the 75th percentile of 
this distribution is roughly 75 miles.  
 
To isolate the reverse relationship—the impact of the number of LEED registrations on the 
number of LEED Accredited Professionals—we require an instrumental variable that is 
correlated with the number of LEED registrations but uncorrelated with unobserved drivers of 
local real estate professionals’ decisions to seek accreditation. Building on the instrumental 
variables strategy used in Corts (2010), we use Total New Buildings as an instrument for Total 
Private LEED Registrations. Intuitively, as the number of new building starts increases, so does 
the probability of having one or more LEED-registered projects that could stimulate investment 
among real estate professionals to become LEED Accredited Professionals. Moreover, since we 
condition on Population and New Buildings, the key assumption underlying the validity of our 
instrument is that variation in the intensity of development (that is, the number of buildings per 
capita within each city) between 2003 and 2007 will affect the number of private LEED 
registrations (for example, because of competition among developers) without otherwise altering 
the incentive for real estate professionals to seek LEED accreditation. Because the number of 
new buildings is clearly exogenous to an individual real estate professional’s decision to seek 
LEED accreditation, the main concern with this instrument is that omitted variables might be 
correlated with both building activity and LEED accreditation rates. Thus, we continue to control 
for various city-level measures of green taste. 
 
Instrumental Variable Results.—The estimation sample for our IV analysis includes all cities 
that did not adopt a green building procurement policy. All models control for Population, 
Income, College, Prius Share, and Green Ballot Share. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 report OLS 
and IV estimates of the impact of Total LEED Accredited Professionals on Total Private LEED   28
Registrations.
32 Column 1 reports OLS estimates of the correlation between the number of LEED 
Accredited Professionals in the cities within 25 miles of a focal city and the number of LEED 
registrations in that focal city. This correlation is statistically significant and suggests an increase 
of 0.14 private LEED registrations per log-point increase in the number of LEED Accredited 
Professionals in the surrounding cities. Column 2 presents our IV estimates, which use distant 
policy adoption as an instrument for the number of nearby LEED Accredited Professionals. The 
IV results show a very strong first-stage correlation between distant cities with green policies and 
LEED Accredited Professionals in the cities surrounding the focal city; the second-stage result 
indicates a significant positive impact of these nearby LEED Accredited Professionals on the 
number of private LEED registrations. While the IV estimate is very similar to our baseline OLS 
estimate, it is important to stress that our "excess inertia" hypothesis implies that LEED 
Registrations and LEED Accredited Professionals are simultaneously determined, and that the IV 
procedure isolates the response of LEED Registrations to an exogenous shift in the supply of 
Accredited Professionals. The IV estimates imply that adding seven LEED Accredited 
Professionals to nearby cities causes one additional LEED registration in a focal city. This strikes 
us as a plausible figure, particularly if we interpret the number of LEED Accredited 
Professionals as a proxy for other inputs, such as the availability of green building materials 
through local distributors.  
 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 examine the impact of the number of private LEED registrations on 
the number of LEED Accredited Professionals. OLS results are presented in Column 3 as a 
baseline. In Column 4, we use New Buildings as an instrument for Private LEED Registrations. 
Once again, we find a strong first-stage relationship and a positive impact of LEED building 
rates on the supply of LEED Accredited Professionals. In this case, the key coefficient increases 
by roughly 60 percent compared to the OLS correlation and a test of the null hypothesis that the 
number of LEED registrations is exogenous is rejected at the five-percent level (p=0.01).  
 
Together, these IV results provide evidence of two positive causal relationships operating 
simultaneously: (1) an increase in the supply of LEED Accredited Professionals causes an 
                                                 
32 We find somewhat larger effects for a sample of medium-size cities (20,000 to 800,000 residents) that did not adopt a green 
building policy. We also obtain estimates similar to those in Columns 2 and 4 of Table 7 if we estimate the full system of 
equations using generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation.   29
increase in the number of private LEED registrations and (2) an increase in the number of private 
LEED registrations causes an increase in the number of LEED Accredited Professionals. These 
indirect network effects are a necessary (though not necessarily sufficient) condition for the 
existence of a chicken-and-egg dilemma in the adoption of a new quality standard.
33  More 
generally, by showing how distant green procurement policies can influence local private LEED 
registration rates through the supply of nearby LEED Accredited Professionals, these results 
point to the importance of supply-side spillovers in the diffusion of LEED.  
IV. Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper provides evidence that public procurement policies can influence private-sector 
purchasing decisions in a way that reinforces underlying policy goals. Given the relative scale of 
public and private purchasing, such an effect might be a necessary condition for public 
procurement guidelines to have substantive impacts comparable to new laws or regulations.  
 
While there is a substantial economic literature asking whether public investments “crowd out” 
private spending (e.g., Goolsbee (1998) on government R&D and Hoxby (1996) on public and 
private education), little research has examined whether or how government spending stimulates 
private-sector investment. We are aware of no prior study that examines whether or not 
government procurement acts as a focal adopter that tips the market towards a particular standard 
or certification scheme, despite this often being a primary stated objective of socially motivated 
government procurement policies such as “buy green” initiatives. 
 
Our evidence of positive spillovers from public procurement is based on private developers 
adopting the LEED green building certification program following the enactment of public   
green building procurement policies—municipal bylaws that require public construction to 
follow green building practices. This is admittedly a case in which one might expect such 
reinforcing spillover effects, since LEED was rapidly emerging as the de facto standard for green 
building certification and many private developers could reasonably expect that green building 
would yield direct economic benefits in the form of energy savings and increased demand. 
                                                 
33 Future work using a larger sample of cities might estimate a structural model that explicitly accounts for the possibility of 
multiple equilibria in the adoption process.   30
Moreover, governments are especially large customers in the construction services sector. 
Further research is needed to examine the extent to which public procurement rules influence 
private purchasing in mature markets in which governments account for a smaller share of total 
demand. Nevertheless, we find that a city with a municipal green building policy had roughly 90 
percent more LEED registrations by 2008 than matched control cities of similar size, 
demographics, and tastes for environmentalism. 
 
Another contribution of our study is to consider several mechanisms that might produce the 
private-sector spillovers discussed in the literature on government procurement, and to link these 
spillovers to the types of coordination problems studied in the industrial organization literature 
on platforms and compatibility standards (e.g., Farrell and Saloner 1986; Rysman 2009). In 
particular, we find evidence of an excess inertia or chicken-and-egg problem—a type of 
coordination failure typically associated with hardware-software platforms—in the diffusion of a 
new quality standard, and we show how this problem might be overcome if local governments 
step in as lead users.  
 
Our analysis is subject to several caveats. First, despite our efforts to construct a well-matched 
control sample using the new methods developed by Iacus, King, and Porro (2012), one might 
still be concerned that our estimates are biased upwards if environmental preferences (beyond 
those we controlled for) are correlated with both municipal procurement policies and private-
sector LEED adoption rates. However, we are somewhat comforted by finding similar “crowding 
in” effects in a sample of neighboring cities that had not themselves adopted green building 
policies. We also find no evidence of a divergence in LEED adoption between treated cities 
(either policy adopters or their neighbors) and their matched controls prior to the change in 
procurement policy. These findings provide evidence against stories of reverse causation or 
policy adoption by municipalities that are “captured” by greener elements of the real estate 
profession. Our preferred explanation for our main results is that green procurement policies had 
a combined effect that increased awareness of the LEED standard and fostered the development 
of complementary markets for specialized inputs, such as LEED Accredited Professionals. 
 
As second caveat is that we do not measure the environmental impacts of increased LEED   31
adoption (or even the final certification of all registered buildings). Engineering studies suggest 
that LEED certification is correlated with increased energy efficiency, but those estimates are 
based on data from a self-selected sample of LEED-certified buildings. Future research should 
examine the impact of public green building policies on environmental performance.  
 
Finally, since our findings suggest that government procurement policies can catalyze the 
adoption of a privately developed certification scheme, one might ask whether governments 
typically choose the “right” standard? In the case of LEED, it is not clear whether (a) municipal 
green building policies promoted lock-in to a particular standard (the leading alternative was the 
EPA’s Energy Star label) or (b) increasing returns simply led private and public actors to 
coalesce around the most popular measurement system at the time. Nevertheless, our LEED 
Accredited Professionals results show that government purchasing policies can promote 
standard-specific investments by various third parties, such as architects, contractors, and 
suppliers of green building materials. This both points to procurement policies as an effective 
policy tool and highlights the potential dangers of lock-in to a government-selected standard—
particularly if it was developed by firms hoping to preempt more stringent regulation. The 
question of how government should be involved in the ex ante development of voluntary 
standards that might later provide the basis for procurement policies is an intriguing topic for 
future research. 
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Figure 1. Annual U.S. LEED Registrations by Type of Owner 
 
Notes: Graph is for all U.S. nonresidential new construction LEED registrations. Owner type codes provided by U.S. 
Green Building Council. Government includes federal, state, and local. 
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Figure 2. Mean LEED Registrations and Accreditations by Procurement Regime 
 
Note: All figures are based on CEM-weighted annual means. 
 
Figure 3. Geographic Agglomeration in Labor Markets for Real Estate Professionals 
 
Notes: Distance from professional’s address to building location based on great-circle calculations using Harvard Arc-GIS 
mapping software. Vertical bars represent 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile values in the empirical distribution of project-
professional distances.  
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variable Name  Definition  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
Panel A: City-level variables           
Total Private LEED Registrations  Total private LEED-registered buildings during 2001-
08  
1.93 6.25  0.00 99.00
Total LEED Accredited 
Professionals  
Total LEED Accredited Professionals during 2001-08  7.51  27.38  0.00 416.00
Total Government LEED 
Registrations,  
Total government LEED-registered buildings during 
2001-08 
0.29 0.94  0.00 12.00
Green Policy Adopter   City adopted green building policy by 2008 (dummy)  0.04  0.19  0.00 1.00
Green Policy Adopter Neighbor   City adjacent to a city that adopted green building 
policy by 2008 (dummy) 
0.15 0.36  0.00 1.00
Prius Share  Toyota Prius as percent of all car registrations (x 100)  0.54  0.59  0.00 3.74
Green Ballot Share  Percent of votes in favor of green ballot measures  60.73  14.76  19.85 100.00
LCV Senate Score  State senator’s League of Conservation Voters score  46.54  40.88  0.00 100.00
LCV House Score  State representative’s League of Conservation Voters 
score 
49.56 39.97 0.00 100.00
Population City  population  (10,000s) 2.99  5.10  0.00 46.15
Total New Buildings  Total nonresidential construction starts during 2003-07 26.21  54.71  0.00 869.00
Buildings per Capita  New Buildings / Population  12.06  18.42  0.00 204.00
College Percent  college-educated 0.23  0.17  0.01 0.89
Income  Median household income  4.80  2.17  0.00 20.00
Panel B: City-year variables      
Annual Private LEED Registrations  New private LEED-registered buildings this year   0.20  1.32  0.00 52.00
Annual LEED Accredited 
Professionals 
New LEED Accredited Professionals this year  0.04  0.24  0.00 6.00
Annual Government LEED 
Registrations 
New government LEED-registered buildings this year  0.94  5.21  0.00 160.00
Green Policy Adopted  Focal city adopted policy by this year  0.02  0.13  0.00 1.00
Green Policy Adopted Neighbor  Neighbor city adopted policy by this year  0.09  0.29  0.00 1.00
Annual New Buildings  Nonresidential construction starts this year  26.21  54.68  0.00 869.00
Notes: Panel A provides summary statistics for a cross section of 735 California cities. Panel B reports annual variables at the city-year level. 
Both panels exclude Los Angeles, San Diego, San Jose, and San Francisco.
 
 
Table 2. Covariate Balance in Full and Matched Samples 
   Panel A    Panel B     Panel C 
 Sample  Full sample    Green policy adopter cities and 
matched controls 
   Green policy adopter neighboring 
cities and matched controls 
 Weighting  No weights    Weighted     Weighted 
 Green 
policy 
adopters 
All non-
adopters 
t-stat Green 
policy 
adopters 
Matched 
controls 
t-stat   Green 
policy 
adopter 
neighbors  
Matched 
controls 
t-stat 
Prius Share  0.93  0.53 3.62 0.86 0.80 0.41   0.71  0.72 0.05
Green Ballot Share  72.26  60.25 4.35 71.08 68.27 1.09   68.08  65.98 1.36
LCV Senate Score  68.69  45.58 3.00 68.96 60.85 0.81   66.98  65.47 0.27
LCV House Score  69.00  48.53 2.72 65.62 61.64 0.33   64.44  63.64 0.13
Population 14.36  2.53 13.68 13.70 13.51 0.06   3.86  3.71 0.33
Annual New Buildings  140.79  21.59 12.64 139.77 109.53 0.78   25.94  31.26 1.01
Buildings per Capita  10.62  12.20 0.45 10.83 9.98 0.49   10.22  9.73 0.25
College 0.35  0.22 4.09 34.53 34.17 0.10   31.06  29.85 0.39
Income 5.58  4.77 1.97 5.70 5.83 0.33   5.98  6.04 0.12
Cities  29  697    26 180      80 291   
Notes: Panel A reports means of each variable and t-statistic from unweighted OLS regression of the variable on Green Policy Adopter dummy. 
Panels B and C report CEM-weighted means of each variable and the t-statistic from CEM-weighted OLS regression of the variable on Green 
Policy Adopter dummy (middle panel) or Green Policy Adopter Neighbor dummy (right panel).  CEM weights are described in Iacus, King, and 
Porro (2012) and discussed in the text.  
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Table 3. Effects of Green Building Procurement Policies on LEED Registrations and 
Accredited Professionals: Cross-sectional Regression Results 
Sample  Green policy adopter cities  
and matched controls   
Green policy adopter neighboring cities 
and matched controls 
Outcome  Total  
private  
LEED 
registrations
Total 
government 
LEED 
registrations
Total  
LEED  
Accredited 
Professionals   
Total  
private  
LEED 
registrations 
Total 
government 
LEED 
registrations 
Total  
LEED  
Accredited 
Professionals
  Panel A: CEM-weighted OLS Regressions  
  (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) (6) 
Green Policy Adopter  7.46  1.59  15.74       
  [3.26]**  [0.53]*** [14.46]    
Green Policy Adopter Neighbor        0.95  0.23  4.05 
      [0.39]**  [0.10]**  [1.84]** 
CEM-weighted mean outcome  8.29 0.93  40.81  1.55 0.26 7.20 
R-squared  0.56 0.34 0.37    0.28 0.13 0.41 
  Panel B: Unweighted OLS Regressions 
  (7) (8) (9)    (10)  (11)  (12) 
Green Policy Adopter  7.20  1.37  19.95       
  [2.62]*** [0.39]*** [10.94]*     
Green Neighbor Adopter 
Neighbor      0.94  0.22  3.86 
      [0.37]**  [0.10]**  [1.60]** 
Unweighted mean outcome  4.75  0.69  17.95  1.01 0.18 4.48 
R-squared  0.64 0.47 0.59    0.36 0.20 0.38 
Observations  (Cities)  202 202 202    453 453 453 
Notes: CEM-weighted OLS regressions with robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
Models in Panel A include controls for Prius Share, Total New Buildings, College, Income, Green Ballot Share, LCV 
Senate Score, and LCV House Score. Unit of analysis is a city. (See Table 2 for the number of treated and control units 
in the matched samples.) 
Table 4. Effects of Green Building Procurement Policies on LEED Registrations and 
Accredited Professionals: City Fixed-effects Regression Results 
 Sample  Green policy adopter cities  
and matched controls  
Green policy adopter neighboring cities 
and matched controls 
Outcome  Annual  
private  
LEED 
registrations 
Annual 
government 
LEED 
registrations
Annual  
LEED  
Accredited 
Professionals  
Annual  
private  
LEED 
registrations
Annual 
government 
LEED 
registrations 
Annual  
LEED  
Accredited 
Professionals
  (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) (6) 
Green Policy Adopted   2.30  0.27  11.01       
 [0.78]***  [0.11]**  [3.64]***      
Green Policy Adopted         0.15  0.03  1.16    
   Neighbor        [0.07]**  [0.02]  [0.26]*** 
Observations  (city-years)  1672 1672 1672  2968 2968 2968 
Cities  209 209 209  371 371 371 
Mean of outcome  0.50  0.09  2.22  0.10  0.02  0.56 
R-squared  0.17 0.09 0.24  0.11 0.03 0.18 
  F-test for pre-policy trend differences 
F-stat  0.52 2.30 2.39  0.96 0.51 1.78 
P  value  0.72 0.06 0.05  0.42 0.73 0.13 
Notes: OLS coefficients, with robust standard errors (clustered on city) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Unit of 
analysis is a city-year. All regressions include city fixed effects and year fixed effects, control for Annual New Buildings, and do 
not include CEM weights.   
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Table 5: Effects of Green Building Procurement Policy Interacted with Green 
Demographics on LEED Registrations 
Sample Green  policy  adopter 
cities and matched 
controls  
Green policy adopter 
neighboring cities and 
matched controls 
Outcome  Total private LEED registrations  
 (1)  (2)    (3)    (4) 
Green Policy Adopter  6.95  7.36     
 [3.38]**  [2.97]**     
Green Policy Adopter  Prius Share  4.68       
    [5.24]       
Green Policy Adopter  Green Ballot Share    0.03     
   [0.33]     
Green Policy Adopter Neighbor      0.83  0.79 
     [0.34]**  [0.40]* 
Green Policy Adopter Neighbor  Prius Share      0.50   
        [0.62]   
Green Policy Adopter Neighbor  Green Ballot Share        0.02 
          [0.04] 
Observations  (Cities)  206 206    371 371 
R-squared  0.56 0.56    0.28 0.28 
Notes: All models estimated with OLS using CEM weights. Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.10. Unit of analysis is a city. Additional unreported controls are Prius Share, Green Ballot Share, 
LCV Senate Score, LCV House Score, Total New Buildings, Population, College, and Income.  
Table 6: Effects of Green Building Procurement Policy Interacted with City-Size on LEED 
Professional Accreditations 
Sample Green  policy  adopter 
cities and matched 
controls 
 Green  policy  adopter 
neighboring cities and 
matched controls 
Outcome Total  LEED  Accredited Professionals 
  (1) (2)    (3) (4) 
Green Policy Adopter  -2.78  -8.30     
 [13.51]  [11.03]     
Green Policy Adopter  Population  2.91      
     [1.27]**     
Green Policy Adopter  Total New Buildings   0.39    
       [0.08]***    
Green Policy Adopter Neighbor      3.44  3.61 
     [1.72]**  [1.56]** 
Green Policy Adopter Neighbor  Population     0.39  
         [0.62]   
Green Policy Adopter Neighbor  Total New Buildings      0.05 
           [0.08]    
Observations (Cities)  206  206     371  371 
R-squared  0.42 0.48      0.41 0.42 
Notes: All models estimated with OLS using CEM weights. Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.10. Unit of analysis is a city. Additional unreported controls are Prius Share, Green Ballot Share, 
LCV Senate Score, LCV House Score, Total New Buildings, Population, College, and Income.      
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Table 7: OLS and IV Estimates of Indirect Network Effects  
Sample  All cities without green procurement policy 
Outcome  Total Private LEED 
registrations 
Total LEED Accredited 
Professionals 
Estimation  OLS IV  OLS IV 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
log(Total of LEED Accredited Professionals   0.14  0.17     
within 25 miles)  [0.06]**  [0.08]**     
Total Private LEED Registrations      2.17  3.43 
     [0.26]***  [0.49]*** 
  First-stage coefficients and statistics 
log(Number of cities with green policy within 25 to    1.29     
50 miles in 2008)    [0.07]***     
Total New Buildings        0.05 
       [0.01]*** 
       
F-test of excluded IVs    322.11***    48.25*** 
       
Observations  (cities)  697 697    697 697 
R-squared  0.41 0.41    0.55 0.47 
 
Notes: OLS and instrumental variable regressions with robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.10. Unit of analysis is a city. All models include controls for Prius Share, Green Ballot 
Share, Population, College, and Income. 
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Appendix. California Cities with a Green Building Policy by 2008 
  City   In matched 
sample 
Population 
(10,000s) 
1  Los Angeles  No  369.49 
2  San Diego  No  122.34 
3  San Jose  No  89.50 
4  San Francisco  No  77.67 
5  Long Beach  Yes  46.15 
6  Sacramento Yes  40.70 
7  Oakland No  39.95 
8  Anaheim Yes  32.80 
9  Stockton Yes  24.38 
10  Fremont Yes  20.34 
11  Glendale Yes  19.50 
12  Santa Clarita  Yes  15.07 
13  Santa Rosa  Yes  14.76 
14  Irvine Yes  14.31 
15  Sunnyvale Yes  13.18 
16  Corona Yes  12.50 
17  Costa Mesa  Yes  10.87 
18  Berkeley No  10.27 
19  Santa Clara  Yes  10.24 
20  Ventura No  10.09 
21  Richmond Yes  9.92 
22  Santa Barbara  Yes  9.23 
23  Santa Monica  Yes  8.41 
24  San Leandro  Yes  7.95 
25  Carlsbad Yes  7.82 
26  Livermore Yes  7.33 
27  Alameda Yes  7.23 
28  Temecula Yes  5.77 
29  La Mesa  Yes  5.47 
30  Cupertino Yes  5.05 
31  West Hollywood  Yes  3.57 
32  Dublin Yes  3.00 
33  Cotati Yes  0.65 
 
 